correspondance d'Alice Kanterian :
TURKISH GAMBIT: THE SYRIFICATION OF THE WAR
The main purpose of the scenario-builders and the director of the ongoing war is
to oust the Russian Federation from the South Caucasus, and, eventually, from the
entire Caucasus. One of the options is to syrify the Karabakh issue. Turkey’s yearning
to enter the negotiation process as a heavyweight and influential actor, compelling to
give up the OSCE Minsk Group format. The prime target in President Erdoğan’s almost
all speeches is the OSCE Minsk Group, and his vision – adapting the Astana process of
the Syrian conflict resolution in the South Caucasus. The hint is clear: spheres of
influence for the talk process-engaged states Turkey, Islamic Republic of Iran and the
Russian Federation. Thus, in case of Turkey it is not the efficient activity of the
aforementioned forces, but rather their presence, which unwittingly does imply the idea
of syrifying the current factors and processes if not in the frameworks of the war, then at
least in those of the conflict. If such a scenario is played, then Turkey, irrespective of the
war results for Azerbaijan, will be a winning party.
to oust the Russian Federation from the South Caucasus, and, eventually, from the
entire Caucasus. One of the options is to syrify the Karabakh issue. Turkey’s yearning
to enter the negotiation process as a heavyweight and influential actor, compelling to
give up the OSCE Minsk Group format. The prime target in President Erdoğan’s almost
all speeches is the OSCE Minsk Group, and his vision – adapting the Astana process of
the Syrian conflict resolution in the South Caucasus. The hint is clear: spheres of
influence for the talk process-engaged states Turkey, Islamic Republic of Iran and the
Russian Federation. Thus, in case of Turkey it is not the efficient activity of the
aforementioned forces, but rather their presence, which unwittingly does imply the idea
of syrifying the current factors and processes if not in the frameworks of the war, then at
least in those of the conflict. If such a scenario is played, then Turkey, irrespective of the
war results for Azerbaijan, will be a winning party.
Engagement of Syria- and Libya-operating terrorist groups in the Karabakh
warfield carries the message of syrifying the developments, i.e., assumes both military
and political significance.
In essence, the war that broke out on 27 September, 2020, ended in Azerbaijan’s
defeat. As a result, Azerbaijan placed the command of its armed forces under Turkey’s
control.
warfield carries the message of syrifying the developments, i.e., assumes both military
and political significance.
In essence, the war that broke out on 27 September, 2020, ended in Azerbaijan’s
defeat. As a result, Azerbaijan placed the command of its armed forces under Turkey’s
control.
The ongoing war is between Armenia and Turkey. Turkey and Azerbaijan wish to
feature this war as being Armenian-Turkic in nature, thus guaranteeing the Turkic
states’ and nations’ support. In the given context we can consider the fact that in line
with mercenaries from “Sultan Murad”, “Hamza”, and “Nour al-Din al-Zenki” terrorist
groups of mixed ethnic composition (including Turkmen-staffed), also militants from the
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (i.e., Uyghurs), who had shaped their experience
in Syrian actions, have been transported to the war zone on Turkey’s initiative;
simultaneously the circulation of news that anti-Armenian demonstrations are being
feature this war as being Armenian-Turkic in nature, thus guaranteeing the Turkic
states’ and nations’ support. In the given context we can consider the fact that in line
with mercenaries from “Sultan Murad”, “Hamza”, and “Nour al-Din al-Zenki” terrorist
groups of mixed ethnic composition (including Turkmen-staffed), also militants from the
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (i.e., Uyghurs), who had shaped their experience
in Syrian actions, have been transported to the war zone on Turkey’s initiative;
simultaneously the circulation of news that anti-Armenian demonstrations are being
staged by Turkic-speaking Azaris in the Islamic Republic of Iran (in Ardabil, Tabriz,
Urmia), targeted at closing the RA-IRI border.
Urmia), targeted at closing the RA-IRI border.
However, the current war is also Russian-Turkish in its nature.
Turkey, by reinforcing its position in the South Caucasus, enlarges its own field of
bargain within the frameworks of the Greater Middle East. Moreover, the present logic
of the war tends to weaken the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), since it
consistently pushes the efficiency of the Turkey-Azerbaijan alliance to the fore (within
the frameworks of “Two nations, one state” and “One nation, one army” slogans), and
the CSTO-engaged allies’ consolidation – to the background.
Turkey, by reinforcing its position in the South Caucasus, enlarges its own field of
bargain within the frameworks of the Greater Middle East. Moreover, the present logic
of the war tends to weaken the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), since it
consistently pushes the efficiency of the Turkey-Azerbaijan alliance to the fore (within
the frameworks of “Two nations, one state” and “One nation, one army” slogans), and
the CSTO-engaged allies’ consolidation – to the background.
The war does have also psychological and demonstrative significance. Though
the Turkish army controls numerous military strongholds and takes cross-border actions
in Northern Iraq, Northern Syria and Libya, any kind of military engagement of Turkey in
the South Caucasus was unthinkable, owing to the Russian factor, before the war broke
out in September, 2020.
By crossing the red lines Turkey overcame the psychological barrier against the
Russian factor, as well. Moreover, with a view on the Greek-Turkish tensions in the
East of the Mediterranean, and the aggravation between France and Turkey, the direct
military involvement of Turkey in the South Caucasus (in fact, the war between Armenia
and Turkey) is a specific message to Greece and other EU states on the decisiveness
of Turkey.
The involvement of new actors and factors in the region will be combined with an
unpredictable shift in the power balance in the region, which will eventually result in not
only reviewing the negotiation format of the Karabakh issue, but also drawing Russia to
zugzwang throughout the post-Soviet ethnic, religious and territorial perimeter.
If Armenia is to carry out the function of the separating fortress between Turkey
and the Turkic world, then Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) is the main anchor for Russia in
the South Caucasus.
the Turkish army controls numerous military strongholds and takes cross-border actions
in Northern Iraq, Northern Syria and Libya, any kind of military engagement of Turkey in
the South Caucasus was unthinkable, owing to the Russian factor, before the war broke
out in September, 2020.
By crossing the red lines Turkey overcame the psychological barrier against the
Russian factor, as well. Moreover, with a view on the Greek-Turkish tensions in the
East of the Mediterranean, and the aggravation between France and Turkey, the direct
military involvement of Turkey in the South Caucasus (in fact, the war between Armenia
and Turkey) is a specific message to Greece and other EU states on the decisiveness
of Turkey.
The involvement of new actors and factors in the region will be combined with an
unpredictable shift in the power balance in the region, which will eventually result in not
only reviewing the negotiation format of the Karabakh issue, but also drawing Russia to
zugzwang throughout the post-Soviet ethnic, religious and territorial perimeter.
If Armenia is to carry out the function of the separating fortress between Turkey
and the Turkic world, then Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) is the main anchor for Russia in
the South Caucasus.
Vahram S. Petrosyan, Doctor of History, Associate Professor
David M. Manasyan, Doctor of History
Suivez-nous !
